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―Reality is infinitely various when compared to the deductions of abstract thought, even those 
that are most cunning, and it will not tolerate rigid, hard and fast distinctions. Reality strives for 
diversification.‖           - Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The House of the Dead 
 
ABSTRACT  
In spite of the increasing scientific certainty that the earth's climate is warming and that human 
activity is partially responsible, public willingness to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions seems to be decreasing.  How can the scientific consensus as to the urgency of the 
climate change problem be conveyed to the general public in such a way as to support 
greenhouse gas abatement policies and to actually change behavior?  This essay explores the 
standard economic approach to environmental pollution and discusses findings from behavioral 
economics and neuroscience that could lead to a more fruitful understanding of the relationship 
between economic policy and human psychology.  This essay is a background paper prepared for 
the Garrison Institute's "Climate, Mind and Behavior" initiative.  
 
I. The Gulf between Science and Public Perception in the Climate Change Debate 
   The climate change debate has taken on a new urgency with the latest scientific information 
about current CO2 emissions, projections of future CO2 levels, and past climate regimes. 
Between 1990 and 1999, CO2 emissions grew at a rate of 1.1% per year.  Since 2000 the annual 
growth rate has been above 3% (Raupach et al. 2007).  Recent emission rate projections are 
substantially higher than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the 
Stern Review, primary because of coal burning in China (Auffhammer and Carson 2008; Botzen, 
Gowdy, van den Bergh 2008).  In view of the magnitude of emission increases it seems unlikely 3 
 
that a ―safe‖ level of atmospheric CO2 can be maintained. Based on several independent lines of 
reasoning and evidence, including controlled greenhouse experiments, past climate records, and 
computer modeling, we know that past fossil fuel emissions alone will eventually cause the earth 
to heat by several degrees Celsius.  Over the past 800,000 years atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 have varied between 180ppm and 280ppm (Dichter et al. 2008). CO2 levels during this 
period are positively and tightly correlated with temperatures and sea levels. These 50ppm 
fluctuations around the average of 230ppm were enough to push the earth between warm periods 
comparable to today‘s climate to extremely cold ice age conditions. In 2009 atmospheric CO2 
levels measured at Mauna Loa, Hawaii reached 390ppm, an increase over preindustrial levels of 
more than 100ppm. A recent article in Science (Tripati, Roberts and Eagle 2009) reports that 
during the Middle Miocene, some 10-14 million years ago, CO2 levels were about the same as 
today‘s but temperatures were 3C to 6C warmer and sea levels were 25 to 40 meters higher. If 
past climate regimes are an indication of what we can expect in the future, larege, abrupt, and 
unpredictable changes can be expected in the coming centuries. 
    The chances of limiting CO2 emissions to a level consistent with today‘s stable climate 
regime are bleak. CO2 levels could reach 2000 ppm within a few centuries if the readily available 
coal, petroleum and natural gas are burned (Kump 2002). Kasting (1998) believes that the most 
likely scenario is that atmospheric CO2 will peak at about 1200 ppm sometime in the next 
century. A climate-carbon model developed by Bala et al. (2005) has the business-as-usual CO2 
peak occurring around the year 2300 at 1400 ppm. Recent emissions scenarios by the IPCC 
include a worst case, carbon intensive scenario projecting a level of 1370 ppm by 2100 (Kintisch 
2008). Obviously, if CO2 levels reach these extremes, abrupt and catastrophic climate events are 
all the more likely. A recent re-examination of CO2 levels during extreme ―hothouse earth‖ 
climate regimes indicates that levels were around 1000ppm, not 3,000-4,000ppm as previously 
thought (Newton 2010). The scientific consensus is that delaying emission reductions for even a 
few more years may be disastrous (Anderson and Bows 2008; Archer 2009; Jaeger, 
Schnellnhuber and Brovkin 2008).  
But how can this information be conveyed to the general public in such a way as to 
support greenhouse gas abatement policies and to actually change behavior?  There is a gulf 
between the scientific consensus as to the seriousness of the risks of climate change and public 
perception of the problem.  More than half of Americans, about 54% (Leiserowitz 2007), favor a 4 
 
wait-and-see approach to emissions reduction policies. Studies have shown that even well-
educated people have difficulty with problems involving even moderately long chains of 
causality (Sterman 2008).  Complicating public perception of the problem is the fact that climate 
change science is still plagued with uncertainty about the timing of future warming and the role 
of various feedback mechanisms accelerating or delaying the impacts of current fossil fuel use.  
It has been suggested that public acceptance of the aggressive policies needed to mitigate the 
most serious damages from further climate change could be enhanced by a better understanding 
of the mental models people use to evaluate long term risks (Leiserowitz 2006).  Most 
Americans are concerned about climate change yet they are reluctant to support the public 
policies required to mitigate it or to change personal behavior (Jamieson 2006; Oppenheimer and 
Todorov 2006).  One reason seems to be that they view the problem as affecting those in the 
distant future and those in distant countries.  Another reason is more basic. Humans, like other 
mammals, evolved to respond effectively to immediate threats. It is difficult for most people to 
respond forcefully to the threat of climate change, with all its uncertainties about magnitude and 
timing, when we face so many more immediate concerns.  
Another complicating factor shaping attitudes about climate change is the ―groupishness‖ 
of human behavior (van den Bergh and Gowdy 2009). On major issues, including climate 
change, opinions are often adopted to conform to those of a person‘s reference group rather than 
to objective scientific information. The good news is that humans are not bound by hard and fast 
behavioral rules. Humans are to a large extent unique among the animal kingdom in their ability 
to empathize with others and plan for the distant future. As indicated by an array of popular 
books (Nudge, Predictably Irrational, Animal Spirits), economists are relying more and more on 
behavioral science for insights into human behavior. Behavioral economics and neuroscience is 
beginning to uncover patterns that may help to formulate effective policies and design effective 
institutions to meet the growing threat of disruptive climate change.  
  
II. What is Behavioral Economics, What is Neuroeconomics?  
The field of economics has prospered over the last century by focusing its attention on a 
few key insights—the importance of individual incentives in motivating behavior, that humans 
strive to do the best they can with the limited means at their disposal, and the ability of economic 
actors to self-organize to efficiently solve resource allocation problems. These insights are 5 
 
deeply rooted in Western culture (Sahlins 1996) and are central themes in the Classical 
Economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. In many ways behavioral 
economics is a return to the psychological foundations of economics that was all but abandoned 
when economic theory was recast as a purely mathematical problem of constrained optimization. 
The mathematical requirements of the constrained optimization approach are embodied in 
neoclassical assumptions about human behavior embodied in what is variously called ―the 
rational actor model,‖ ―Homo economicus, or simply ―economic man.‖    
Behavioral economics began with the discovery by economists of so-called ―anomalies‖ 
in human behavior, that is, deviations from the assumptions embodied in the neoclassical model. 
One of the first anomalies reported in the standard economics literature is the Allais (1953) 
paradox. Given the choice between a 100% chance of receiving $1 million dollars or a 50/50 
chance of receiving either $2.1 million or zero, which would you pick? Almost everyone would 
pick the sure $1 million even though the expected payoff is higher for the second choice (.5 
times $2.1million or $1,050,000). This directly contradicted the ―independence axiom‖ of 
standard expected utility theory. Deviations from standard choice theory slowly accumulated in 
the economics literature as a growing number of economists recognized the importance of 
modern psychology in understanding economic behavior. During the 1950s and 1960s pioneers 
like Daniel Ellsberg, Harvey Leibenstein, Tibor Scitovsky, Herbert Simon, and Robert Strotz 
pushed the standard economic model toward more realism. In the 1960s and 1970s the field of 
psychology began to move closer to economics as the metaphor for the human brain changed 
from a stimulus-response mechanism to an information processing device (Camerer and 
Loewenstein 2004, p. 6). The convergence of these trends in economics and psychology had two 
important consequences that established the field of behavioral economics. First, criticism of 
rational economic man became focused on testable scientific hypotheses of consumer choice 
theory. It was no longer enough for standard economists to just say, ―We don‘t believe your 
criticisms, we think humans are self-regarding utility maximizers.‖ Once controlled experiments 
falsified basic assumptions of the rational actor model it was incumbent upon the defenders of 
the model to refute or accept the experimental results. The second consequence was the 
establishment of regularities in human behavior (loss aversion, reference dependency, the 
endowment effect, altruistic punishment). The final step, currently incomplete but well 6 
 
underway, is to use the findings of behavioral economics to construct a more complete and 
science-based theory of human decision-making.            
Neuroeconomics focuses on how the human brain processes information by measuring 
neural activity using sensory devices, eye-tracking and other physical indicators of brain activity.  
It is closely related to behavioral economics and also grew out of a reaction against neoclassical 
choice theory. Like behavioral economics, the field was inspired by the early work of Allais and 
Ellsberg, and also by Herbert Simon‘s theories of bounded rationality. In the 1970s Kahneman 
and Tversky constructed a number of psychological experiments involving choice, judgment, 
and decision making that not only further undermined rational choice theory but also laid the 
groundwork for neuroscientists to examine specific brain functions. Glimscher, Camerer, Fehr 
and Poldrack (2009, p. 4) write:  
 
―…[T]he neoclassical school had a clear theory and sharp predictions, but the behavioral 
economists continued to falsify elements of that theory with compelling empirical 
examples. Neuroeconomics emerged from within behavioral and experimental economics 
because behavioral economists often proposed theories that could be thought of as 
algorithms regarding how information was processed, and the choices that resulted from 
that information processing.‖  
 
Today, modern non-invasive tools of neuroscience, like fMRI scanning, have made it possible to 
confirm that the behavioral regularities uncovered by behavioral economics have a physiological 
(and by implication, evolutionary) basis. 
An interesting and somewhat ironic tension exists within neuroeconomics. Many 
economists see neuroeconomics as an alternative to the rigidities of the standard economic model 
while neuroscientists see that model as providing a needed theoretical framework to organize a 
mass of loosely related data. This tension is described by Cohen and Blum (Neuron 36(2) 
introduction to special issue on ―Reward and Decision‖):  
Within neuroscience, for example, we are awash with data that in many cases lack a 
coherent theoretical understanding…Conversely, in economics, it has become abundantly 
evident that the pristine assumptions of the ―standard economic model‖—that individuals 
operate as optimal decision makers in maximizing utility—are in direct violation of even 
the most basic facts about human nature.  
 
Prominent neuroscientists (Glimscher for example) who were trained as psychologists envy the 
mathematical and logical precision of neoclassical theory and look to that model as a way of 7 
 
organizing a rather disjointed field. On the other hand, prominent economists (Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, for example) see the ―anomalies‖ uncovered by behavioral economics 
as a refutation of standard (Walrasian) theory. Neuroscience provides physiological evidence that 
neurobiological features of the human brain insure that most people do not act ―as if‖ they are 
rational utility maximizers. 
  The one framework that can link behavioral economics and neuroeconomics is modern 
evolutionary theory. Human behavior is a complex outcome of the interactions between ―nature‖ 
and ―nurture‖. There is no hard and fast separation between the two. The belief that they are 
separate has been referred to as Descartes error—the separation of mind and body, reason and 
emotion (Demasio 1994). Behavior and the neurological structure of the brain have co-evolved 
over eons to solve some basic survival problems. In the case of humans, cultural behavior is a 
complex and complicating factor but it too can be analyzed using the basic Darwinian framework 
of variation, selection and retention of evolved traits (Hodgson 2004). The evolutionary 
perspective on behavioral economics and neuroeconomics is discussed in detail in Section XI 
below.         
 
III. Back to Adam Smith: Returning Psychology and Common Sense Economics 
Gintis (2007) suggests that the current revolution in behavioral economics and 
neuroscience is part of a larger on-going project—namely the unification of the social sciences 
along the lines of the unification of the natural sciences in the twentieth century.   Over the last 
one hundred years or so the basic understandings of such diverse fields as biology, physics and 
chemistry were made to be compatible even though their subject matter is very different. For 
example, although they describe very different processes, the theory of natural selection does not 
contradict the laws of thermodynamics. By contrast, theories of individual human behavior held 
by economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and decision scientists are contradictory and 
incompatible. Gintis (2007, 2) writes:  
The behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. These models 
should be compatible. Indeed, there should be a common underlying model, enriched in 
different ways to meet the particular needs of each discipline. We cannot easily attain this 
goal at present, however, as the various behavioral disciplines currently have incompatible 
models. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for 
rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical 
tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. 8 
 
 
This is not to deny that each social science discipline will have its own realm of inquiry. 
Anthropologists will still study how entire cultures function and how humans physically evolved, 
sociologists will still study the institutions of modern societies, and psychologists will still study 
human mental functions and behaviors. Different disciplines will explore different aspects of 
human behavior and human cultures. But the basic assumptions of one discipline should be 
compatible with the assumptions of the other social sciences regarding ―human nature.‖ Making 
the economic model of behavior compatible with established facts from other behavioral 
sciences will not be an easy task. As Pensdorfer (2006, 712) points out, behavioral economics is 
largely organized around the failures of standard economics rather than being a stand-alone 
alternative. But an alternative is clearly needed. Results from behavioral economics, game 
theory, and neuroscience indicate that simply modifying the basic Homo economicus 
assumptions will not yield a satisfactory model of human behavior. Progress is being made by 
focusing on observing how and why people make choices, identifying consistent patterns in these 
observed choices, and determining how these choices might be predicted (Rieskamp, Busemeyer, 
and Mellers, 2006). 
Behavioral economics and neuroeconomics represent a major step in the unification of 
the social sciences by bringing psychology back into economic theory. In many ways this is a 
return to the Classical roots of economics. Adam Smith‘s first major work was The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and in many ways was a much more ―modern‖ approach to economics than his 
most famous book The Wealth of Nations. Smith described human behavior in all its richness 
including sympathy and compassion for others: 
When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever concerns ourselves than 
by whatever concerns other men; what is it which prompts the generous upon all 
occasions, and the mean upon many, to sacrifice their own interest to the greater interest of 
others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence 
which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the 
strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcable motive, which 
exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the 
breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct...‖ (Adam Smith, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, quoted in Heilbroner 1996, pps. 68-69) 
 
Psychology and social context was important to economists during the hundred years following 
the publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776. David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart 
Mill, and Karl Marx drew heavily on the incipient sciences of human behavior.  9 
 
  Adam Smith gave the world the metaphor of the ―invisible hand‖ to describe the 
workings of the economic system. The economy is a marvelous self-organizing system that 
somehow coordinates production possibilities and consumer desires of billions of people every 
day. But Smith understood that economic activity takes place within a system of morality and 
social constraints on greed and avarice. Smith had no illusions about the benevolence of the 
merchant class nor was he blind to the darker aspects of capitalism: 
 
Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted 
for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against 
those who have none at all. (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, quoted in Heilbroner 1996, 
p. 101) 
 
The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the 
effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert 
his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing 
difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore the habit of such exertion, and 
generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. 
(Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, quoted in Heilbroner 1996, p. 102) 
 
The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is 
always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the publick. To widen 
the market and narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers…The proposal 
of any new law or regulation of commerce which come from this order, ought always to be 
listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long 
and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious 
attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same as with 
that of the publick, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the 
publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and suppressed 
it. (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, quoted in Heilbroner 1996, pp. 94-95) 
 
Smith would have been quite comfortable with the insights from behavioral economics regarding 
the importance of fairness, social context and other-regarding behavior. He argued strongly that 
the interests of the business class frequently conflicted with those of civil society.  One of his 
three reasons for the existence of government (along with national defense and establishing a 
system of justice) was to provide public works and public institutions that it ―cannot be expected 
that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain‖ (quoted in 
Heilbroner 1996, p. 102). Smith, like the other Classical economists, saw clearly the dangers of 
unbridled markets and the need for government provision of public goods.   10 
 
    The scope of economic theory and policy was narrowed considerably after the 
―marginalist revolution‖ in the 1870s. With the importation from thermodynamics of 
mathematical models of equilibrium in a field of forces the richness of Smith‘s invisible hand 
metaphor was reduced to a purely mechanical process of efficient resource allocation (Gowdy 
2009a, Mirowski 1989, chapter 5). In the stripped-down model of rational allocation, economists 
had no use for insights from psychology. Vilfredo Pareto wrote in 1897: 
It is an empirical fact that the natural sciences have progressed only when they have taken 
secondary principles as their point of departure, instead of trying to discover the essence of 
things…Pure political economy has therefore a great interest in relying as little as possible 
on the domain of psychology (Quoted in Glimsher et al. 2009, from Busino 1964). 
 
During the twentieth century, especially in the decades following WWII, the dominant 
view among economists was that preference formation need not be analyzed since it could be 
directly observed in market choices (revealed preference) and, assuming consistency in choice 
and self-regarding behavior, it could be described by simple mathematical axioms. To 
understand the importance of the behavioral revolution in economics it is necessary to have some 
grasp of the essential features of neoclassical welfare economics.    
IV. Neoclassical Welfare Economics 
One reason for the enthusiastic reception of the system developed by Pareto, Leon Walras 
and a few others was that it provided a rigorous and much more sweeping proof of the social 
goodness of Adam Smith‘s invisible hand. An unfettered market economy will lead naturally to 
the greatest possible social welfare, namely to a position where no further trading of goods or 
productive inputs can improve the situation of one person without harming another (called 
Pareto optimality). This is the central tenet of neoclassical economics: 
 
 The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: 
Assume all individuals are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal (Feldman 1987, IV, 890). 
 
The First Fundamental Theorem is a powerful result of the axioms of consumer choice and 
calculus of constrained maximization. The free trade of goods and services in a perfectly 
operating market economy, with a given income distribution, will automatically lead to a 
situation such that there is no feasible alternative that would make society better off.  11 
 
Homo economicus is central to neoclassical welfare economics. The point of Walrasian 
theory is to demonstrate that competitive markets are Pareto optimal. To prove this theorem it is 
necessary to assume that economic agents are self-regarding (not just ―selfish‖). Other-regarding 
preferences include envy, status-seeking, and retaliation as well as altruism. Without the self-
regarding assumption it cannot be proved that free trading of goods among individuals will lead 
to the point where the marginal rates of substitution for goods are the same for all individuals. 
And this result is needed to go on to prove the First Fundamental Theorem. This may seem 
esoteric but the First Fundamental Theorem is one of the great achievements of economic theory, 
that is, to demonstrate the logical and mathematical possibility of Adam Smith‘s invisible hand. 
The Walrasian framework reflects the worldview of many if not most economists—competition 
in free markets leads to the greatest social good. The basic starting point of economic analysis, 
going back to Adam Smith at least, is something like ―people do the best they can with the 
limited means at their disposal.‖ But economics took a wrong turn when this common sense 
observation became severely restricted to something like ―self regarding individuals employ 
perfect logic to maximize a smooth, single-valued, twice differentiable consumption function ‖.  
This is not to deny that markets are a powerful tool for allocating scarce resources. But 
evaluating whether or not particular markets achieve the best possible allocation should be based 
on empirical evidence, not on mathematical derivations.       
The problem is not just that humans are characterized as ―selfish‖ but that they are ―self-
regarding.‖ In the rational actor model, one person‘s evaluation of a payoff does not depend on 
what others have or think. This is clearly false and leads to poor predictions of actual human 
behavior as illustrated by the results of the Ultimatum Game (see below) and other behavioral 
experiments as well as direct evidence from neuroeconomics about physical brain activity.  
There is also a Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that recognizes that 
markets may be imperfect.  
 
The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: 
Assume that all individuals and producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto 
optimal equilibrium can be achieved via the competitive mechanism, provided 
appropriate lump-sum taxes and transfers are imposed on individuals and firms. (Feldman 
1987, vol. IV, 891) 12 
 
 
The second theorem is actually a wide open justification for market intervention. It can 
be used not only to correct market failures but also to impose a more fair distribution of income 
if society so decides. But the second theorem is also based on self-regarding behavior. The 
reason that market outcomes are imperfect is not that people are ―irrational‖ but rather that they 
are responding rationally to ―wrong‖ price signals. These wrong prices can in theory be corrected 
by enlightened intervention in markets so that Homo economicus can choose efficiently to 
achieve Pareto efficiency. But the recognition that markets may be imperfect does not negate the 
fact that economic theory is based on the assumption of autonomous individuals automatically 
self-organizing to assure the common good.    
The whole issue of rationally in economics is a minefield of politics, distribution, social 
justice, etc. If market outcomes do not reflect the results of rational choice then there is nothing 
sacrosanct about any particular outcome. Markets may be ―pretty good‖ allocators of goods and 
resources (given a ―fair‖ initial income distribution and appropriate market failure corrections) 
but this is very different than saying they produce the ―best‖ outcome (when corrected for 
externalities and public goods). This is what extreme free-market advocates fear. ―Irrational‖ 
behavior calls into question the belief that free choice in competitive markets is the key to 
achieving the greatest social good and this opens the door of public regulation far beyond 
―internalizing externalities.‖  Without the axioms of rational consumer choice, including the 
assumption that the preferences of any person are independent of those of all other persons, it 
cannot be proved that Adam Smith‘s invisible hand will lead to the common good. It is no 
wonder that so many economists are reluctant to accept the claims of behavioral economics and 




Within neoclassical theory prices may be 
“distorted” by market failure or 
information asymmetry so that perfectly 
rational consumers are presented with 
defective information. “Wrong” outcomes 
are still consistent with perfect rationality.
$
Rational Market Decisions 
Decision making is self-regarding,
transitive, consistent, based on 
expected utility, present value etc. 
Humans can perfectly process 
information.
Rationality is “bounded”, and 
behavior is other-regarding.
Economic decisions reflect loss
aversion, inconsistent discounting,
embedding effects, reference 
point bias, framing bias etc. 
Market outcomes (revealed 
preferences) do not reflect narrowly 
rational consumer decisions. 
$
Figure 1.  Market outcomes may be imperfect due to wrong prices or wrong decisions.
 
  
In standard theory consumers make rational market choices based on the relative prices of goods 
and services. Economists recognize that sometimes markets are imperfect and that market prices 
might not reflect the true cost of production (the social costs of a firm‘s pollution for example). 
This is covered by the Second Fundamental Theorem which recognizes that governments have a 
legitimate role in making sure that markets are competitive and that the true costs of producing a 
good is reflected in its price. But there is no Fundamental Theorem to cover ―irrational‖ decision 
making on the part of individual consumers (see Figure 1). Again, if market choices (―revealed 
preferences‖) are not rational then there is nothing sacrosanct about market outcomes. Choices 
made even in perfectly competitive markets do not automatically reveal what‘s best for society. 
This is the underlying reason why so many economists get so upset with criticisms of the rational 
actor model. Rational consumers are the lynchpin of the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare 
economics. 
 
V. The Mismatch between Neoclassical Theory and Climate Change Reality 
The most widely used economic models of climate change, including those of Cline 
(1992), Nordhaus (1994), Stern (2007) and others examine climate in a general equilibrium 
framework. In this framework climate change protection is treated as just another possible 14 
 
investment to improve society‘s well-being as measured by the consumption of market goods. 
For example, in Nordhaus‘ models the general equation for intergenerational economic welfare 
is: 
 





) ( )] ( [ ) (   (1) 
where ―total welfare‖ W(t) is to be maximized over all feasible consumption paths C(τ). Utility 
is characterized by a broadly defined utility function , U[C(τ)], which includes both direct and 
indirect consumption at time τ, τ- t is the specific time period considered, and r is the social 
discount rate. The condition for intergenerational sustainability is: 
0 / ) (  dt t dW        (2) 
This is the ―weak‖ or ―economic‖ definition of sustainability: a sustainable economy requires 
non-declining welfare (the stream of consumption goods) over time (Stavins, Wagner and 
Wager, 2002).  
  The mathematical requirements and consequences of this model have surprising 
implications for climate change policy as shown in Figure 2. Any spending on climate change 
mitigation necessarily means reducing (the present discounted value of ) economic output 
because capital is diverted from producing consumer goods. The only reason to invest in climate 
change mitigation by choosing path B over path A is if the potential economic damage from 
climate change is greater than the cost of mitigation. It is a wholly static view of economic 
activity that ignores the potential economic benefits of spurring new energy efficient industries 
and technologies. Furthermore, in most models the only industry directly affected by climate 
change is agriculture so the immediate (marginal) effects of climate change on economic output 











Choose option B only if it adds more to 
Economic output than does option A
 
Figure 2. When to invest in climate change  
 
The Choice of a Discount Rate 
The choice of a discount rate is critical in economic models of climate change and for 
environmental economics in general. Neoclassical economists approach resource allocation 
problems using a financial investment model—a capital investment approach. Resources should 
be allocated to those investments yielding the highest rate of return accounting for uncertainty, 
risk, and the attitude of the investor toward risk. As illustrated in Figure 3, suppose an investor 
has a choice between letting a valuable tree grow at a rate of 4% per year, or cutting the tree 
down, selling it, and putting the money in the bank. Which decision is best depends on the rate of 
interest the bank pays. 16 
 
Substitution of money for ―natural capital‖
Growing forest Money in the bank receiving interest
Figure 3. Whether or not to cut down the forest depends on the rate





If the bank pays 5% interest and the price of timber is constant, the investor will earn more 
money by cutting the tree down and selling it, that is, by converting natural capital into financial 
capital. This simple example is a metaphor for the conversion of the natural world into financial 
capital. The short-comings of applying this simple approach to climate change are numerous and 
include (1) the irreversibility of climate change affects, (2) pure uncertainty as to the effects of 
climate change, (3) the difference between private investment decisions made by individuals at a 
point in time and our responsibility to others living at different times and at different places , (4) 
the implicit assumption that all forms of capital are  substitutable for one another, (5) the 
assumption that reinvestment of natural capital is possible and that future returns on the 
reinvestment are certain, and (6) the assumption that the change being evaluated is marginal, that 
is, it will not substantially alter existing economic conditions including relative prices (Hepburn 
2006) . The discount rate can be seen as a reverse interest rate. In the above example, suppose 
the tree was not growing at all and the rate of interest on money was 6%. By not cutting down 
the tree and putting the money in the bank you would be losing 6% per year. This would be the 
discount rate on the tree in the world of financial investment.      
Surprisingly, even in the most complicated formulations of neoclassical climate change 
models, the differences in the magnitude of the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation 17 
 
are driven by the choice of discount rates (Dasgupta 2006; Nordhaus 2007; Weitzman 2007). 
The rate at which future costs and benefits is discounted is determined by three parameters, the 
social rate of time preference (Δ), the elasticity of consumption (η), and the rate of growth of per 
capita consumption (g).  
r = Δ + η • g     (3) 
The upshot of the sometimes heated debate over the value of these parameters is that there is no 
scientific answer to which particular values in equation (3) should be used. A low discount rate 
(around 1.5% in Stern 2007 and Cline 1992) will lead to cost-benefit results favouring immediate 
and substantial expenditures of resources on climate change mitigation. A higher discount rate 
(around 3% in the Nordhaus‘ model) will lead to cost-benefit results indicating that only 
moderate mitigation polices are needed. Within the standard climate change models the three 
components of r determine how responsible we are for decisions today that increase our well-
being at the expense of future generations. The higher the discount rate the less value we put on 
our negative impacts on those living in the future. It is instructive to examine in detail the factors 
included in the discount rate in the discounting equation and the arguments over their appropriate 
values.  
      The rate of pure time preference (Δ) is a measure of the value of the well-being of future 
generations seen from the perspective of those living today. A positive value for Δ means that, 
all other things being equal, the further into the future we go the less the well-being of persons 
living there is worth to us. The higher the value of Δ the less concerned we are about negative 
impacts in the future. A large literature exists arguing for a variety of different values for pure 
time preference but it is clear by now that there is no empirical way to determine the value of Δ. 
Choosing the rate of pure time preference comes down to a question of ethics and there is scant 
evidence that the discussion has moved toward resolution over the last century. Ramsey (1928, 
261) asserted 80 years ago that a positive rate of pure time preference was ―ethically 
indefensible.‖ On the other side of the debate, Pearce (2003) took the position that a positive 
time discount rate is an observed fact since people do in fact discount the value of things 
expected to be received in the future. But even if we agree to use a market rate, which market 
rate should be used? U.S. market interest rates are typically used but why should these rates be 
the norm? Climate change will affect the entire world‘s population including those from cultures 18 
 
with very different ideas about obligations to the future. Portney and Weyant (1999, 4) point out 
that ―[t]hose looking for guidance on the choice of discount rate could find justification [in the 
literature] for a rate at or near zero, as high as 20 percent, and any and all values in between.‖ 
(quoted in Cole 2008). Frederick, Loewenstein, and O‘Donoghue (2004) report empirical 
estimates of discount rates ranging from -6% to 96,000%! Discounting from the perspective of 
an individual at a point in time is not equivalent to a social discount rate which should reflect the 
long term interest of the entire human species. A positive observed market discount rate merely 
shows that market goods received in the future are worth less to an individual living now, not 
that they are worth less to another at the point they are received in the future.  
     The other important factor in the Ramsey equation determining how much we should care 
about the future is how well-off those in the future are likely to be. The standard economic model 
equates well-being with consumption and, as shown in equation (3), characterizes the material 
well-being of future generations using two components, the growth rate of per capita income in 
the future (g) and the elasticity of consumption (η). The elasticity of consumption shows the 
percentage change in well-being arising from a percentage change in the level of consumption. If 
η is equal to 1, corresponding to a logarithmic utility function, then 1% of today‘s income has the 
same value as 1% of income at some point in the future. So if per capita income today is $10,000 
and income in the year 2100 is $100,000, $1,000 today has the same value as $10,000 in 2100. 
With that income growth assumption, in the standard climate change model, a $1,000 sacrifice 
today would be justified only if it added at least $10,000 to the average income of people living 
in the year 2100 (Quiggin 2007). The higher the value of η, the higher the future payoff must be 
for a sacrifice today. A number of assumptions are buried in the term η. It is assumed that η is 
independent of the level of consumption, that it is independent of the growth rate of 
consumption, that only consumption increases well-being, and (usually) that its value is equal to 
1 (Nordhaus 1994, Stern 2007). These assumptions are arbitrary and adopted mainly for 
convenience.  
     The climate change debate has demonstrated clearly that how much the current generation 
should change its behavior (which may or may not involve sacrifice) to protect future 
generations is a matter of ethics and best guesses as to the magnitude of future damages due to 
climate change. This realization had led several prominent economists to question the 
applicability of standard economic analysis to problems involving the well-being of distant 19 
 
generations in the face of pure uncertainty and massive environmental changes. Quiggin (2007, 
18) writes of the economic analysis of climate change: ―The real difficulty here is that we are 
pushing economic analysis to its limits, in an area where fundamental problems, such as the 
equity premium puzzle remain unresolved. Economists can help define the issues, but it is 
unlikely that economics can provide a final answer.‖   
    The increasing scepticism of leading environmental economists as to the usefulness of 
standard theory has also led naturally to a questioning of the role of markets in solving 
environmental problems. Partha Dasgupta, one of the pioneers of modern environmental 
economics writes:  
The advances that have taken place in ecological economics in recent years have 
owed much to collaboration between ecologists and economists. Among those advances is 
a heightened awareness of the ubiquity of non-linearities in ecological processes and the 
inability of the price mechanism – even a complete specification of property rights – to 
allocate resources efficiently (Dasgupta 2008, 6).   
   Like  many  economists,  Martin  Weitzman  is  sceptical  of  the  Stern  Review’s  choice  of 
parameter values. But he sees the Stern Review as ―an opportunity for economists to take stock 
of what we know about this subject, how we know it, what we don‘t know, and why we don‘t 
know it‖ (Weitzman, 2007, 703).  
  The  latest  views  of  Weitzman  (2007)  and  Dasgupta  (2007,  2008)  suggest  a  profound 
reformulation of the economic analysis of climate change. We are in uncharted waters where the 
costs  of  mitigation  may  be  large  but  the  cost  of  inaction  is  potentially  infinite,  namely  the 
extinction of our species and a catastrophic reorganization of the earth‘s climate and biosphere. It 
is likely that the magnitude of damages from the mega-greenhouse will be so great as to lie 
outside the marginal effects on GDP that have been the focus of traditional models. Weitzman 
notes that most of the damages of global warming are likely to be unmeasured by GDP.  
  Weitzman‘s major contribution to the Stern Review debate is to highlight the importance of 
recognizing the limits of standard science in dealing with situations involving large uncertainties 
about the possibility of catastrophic future events. In Weitzman‘s view the economic analysis of 
global warming should be seen not a problem of smoothing consumption over time but rather 
determining how much insurance to provide to avoid a small chance of ruinous catastrophe.  
  The discounting equation above (3) may have been misused by economists, but it contains 
the three essential questions as to our responsibility to future generations. How should we value 20 
 
the well-being of those living in the future that will be impacted by policy decisions we make 
today (Δ)? How well-off will those in the future be (g)? How much happier will they be made by 
additions to their material well-being (η)? It turns out that how people discount the future is one 
of the central questions that behavioral economists and neuroscientists are beginning to answer. 
How people discount the future is perhaps the most important ethical question in the climate 
policy debate. But discounting is also central to individual behavior and a key determinate of 
how much people are willing to move toward sustainable behavior.  
  To summarize, the built-in assumptions of the neoclassical model as typified by Nordhaus‘ 
dynamic, integrated climate and economy (DICE) model include: 
1. Individual human well-being is measured by income and social welfare is measured by the 
sum of individual income. In the standard model climate change mitigation policies are justified 
only if they lead to a net increase in per capita consumption (income). 
2. Income received in the future is discounted—future income is worth less than income 
received in the present.         
3. The standard model is entirely static. There is no adequate description of the dynamic 
complexity that characterizes real economies.  
4. Consumer goods (and productive inputs) are always substitutable for one another. There is 
nothing unique about anything that gives people utility, including a stable climate. 
5. There is no notion of humans as biological creatures living within social and environmental 
contexts. 
6. Economic agents (consumers and producers) are entirely autonomous. Consumers are not 
influenced by the actions or characteristics of other consumers, producers are unaffected by other 
producers.   
7. The only value of a stable climate is its contribution to economic value (broadly defined). 
 
Modifying these assumptions has proved to be very difficult, if not impossible, within the 
mathematics of the standard Walrasian  model. In particular, the independent actor assumption 
turned out to be the fatal flaw in the model that opened the door for the behavioral attack on the 
neoclassical model.    
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VI. Three Game Theory Experiments 
In the 1950s and 1960s the inconsistencies uncovered by Allais, Ellsberg, and others 
were considered to be oddities. They were thought to be interesting but irrelevant to economic 
theory. This began to change in the 1980s when carefully designed experiments documented the 
fact that ―anomalies‖ to the rational actor model were not only widespread but actually 
dominated human decision making.  By the turn of the twenty-first century experimental results 
from behavioral economics, evolutionary game theory and neuroscience had firmly established 
that human choice is a social, not self-regarding, phenomenon. Two broad principles emerged 
from the behavioral economics literature: (1) human decision-making cannot be accurately 
predicted without reference to social context, and (2)  regular patterns of decision-making, 
including responses to rewards and punishments, can be predicted both within particular cultures 
and across cultures. These principles emerged in large part because of controlled experiments 
from the field of game theory. In particular, three classic game theory experiments, The 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma (PD), The Ultimatum Game (UG), and The Public Goods (PG) Game 
proved to be decisive in establishing behavioral regularities that contradicted the assumptions of 
the standard economic model. 
  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma - For many years game theory was one of the bastions of orthodoxy in 
economics. The classic textbook example of the inevitability of selfish behavior is the Prisoner‘s 
Dilemma.  The setting for the game is this. The police have captured two people, the Gecko 
brothers, Seth and Quentin, suspected of committing a serious crime. The case against them is 
not strong so they need a confession from at least one of them. They put the two brothers in 
separate rooms and offer them the deal shown in Figure 4.  If neither confesses they get 3 years 
each. If they both confess they get 4 years each. If one confesses and the other does not the 
confessor gets 1 year and the non-confessor gets 6 years. The way the game is framed it is 
―rational‖ for Seth or Quentin to confess no matter what the other one does. Suppose Seth 
confesses, then Quentin should confess in order to get 4 years instead of six. Suppose Seth does  
not confess, then Quentin should also confess in this case to get 1 year instead of 3. The same 
logic applies to Seth who should also confess no matter what Quentin does. This is called a Nash 
Equilibrium (named for Nobel laureate John Nash) which occurs when each player‘s strategy is 
optimal, given the strategies of the other players. A player has a dominant strategy if that 22 
 
player‘s best strategy does not depend on what other players do (as in the prisoner‘s dilemma – 








6 years for Quentin
1 year for Seth
1 year for Quentin
6 years for Seth
Figure 4. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
 
  
The theoretical result of the PD game, no cooperation, is based on the assumption that there 
is no interaction between the two players. But in repeated PD games people tend to cooperate. 
That is, after two players become accustomed to playing with each other a degree of trust 
develops so that they cooperate to get lighter sentences. More surprisingly, even in one-shot 
anonymous PD experiments, over one half of the players cooperate (Field, 2001).  Among the 
first two people to play the game in the 1950s were the imminent economist and mathematician 
Armen Alchian and John Williams, a distinguished mathematician at the Rand Corporation. 
When they cooperated in the one-shot PD game John Nash remarked, ―I would have thought 
them more rational‖ (quoted in Field, 2001). 
 
The Ultimatum Game - One of the most important contributions to behavioral economics was the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) formulated more than twenty-five years ago by Güth, Schmittberger and 
Schwarz (1982). In the Ultimatum Game a leader offers one of two participants a certain sum of 
money and instructs that participant to share it with the second player. The second player can 
either accept the offer or reject it in which case neither player gets anything. If the players 23 
 
behave according to model of Homo economicus, the first player should offer the minimum 
amount and the second player should accept any positive offer. More should always be preferred 
to less no matter what the social context is. Results from the UG game show, however, that the 
majority of proposers in Western countries offer between 40% and 50% of the total and that 
offers under 30% of the total are usually rejected because they are not ―fair‖ (Nowak, Page and 
Sigmund, 2000). These results have held up even when the game is played with substantial 
amounts of real money (Gowdy, Iorgulescu, and Onyeiwu, 2003). 
Like the PD game before it, the UG helped revolutionize the way economists think about 
economic decision making.
 Results from this game, as well as from a variety of other game 
theoretic experiments, showed that, in a variety of settings and under a variety of assumptions, 
other-regarding motives are a better predictor of behavior than those embodied in Homo 
economicus. Humans regularly exhibit a culturally-conditioned sense of fairness and they are 
willing to enforce cultural norms even at economic cost to themselves. This is called altruistic 
punishment. Cross-cultural UG experiments also show that cultural norms vary and that they 
dramatically affect the average amount offered in the game and the rates of rejection (Henrich et 
al. 2001). A striking result of numerous UG experiments is that the model of rational economic 
man is not supported in any culture studied.  Henrich et al. (2001, 73-74) summarize the results 
of behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies ranging from hunter-gatherers in Tanzania 
and Paraguay to nomadic herders in Mongolia:  
We can summarize our results as follows. First the canonical model is not supported in 
any society studied. Second, there is considerable more behavioral variability across 
groups than had been found in previous cross-cultural research, and the canonical model 
fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments. Third, group-level 
differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a 
substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of 
market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level of 
cooperation in experimental games. Fourth, individual-level economic and demographic 
variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups. Fifth, behavior in the 
experiment is generally consistent with economic patterns in everyday life in these 
societies.     
The Public Goods game - Another standard game is the public goods game. This game has many 
variants but a typical version goes something like this. There are ten players and they play the 
game for ten rounds. On each round each player is given the choice of depositing some amount 24 
 
of money (say 50¢) in ―community pool‖ or keeping a larger amount for himself (say $1). If he 
deposits 50¢ in the common pool, he and the nine other players get 50¢ each. So if all players are 
cooperative then each player receives $5 per round (10 X 50¢) for a total of $50 at the end of the 
ten round game. If all players are selfish they only get $1 per round or $10 at the end of the 
game. The catch is that if one player acts selfishly and the other players cooperate, the selfish 
player gets $5.50 per round (9 X 50¢ + $1) and all the others get $4.50 (9 X 50¢). So it pays to 
be a defector (free rider) if the rest of the players cooperate. Standard welfare theory predicts that 
―rational‖ players would never cooperate and that each player would take $1 for him or herself 
starting with round one of the game. But results of public good games show much more 
complicated behavior. Typically the majority of players begin by cooperating but then they 
change their behavior to defecting when they see others being selfish. If the game is played many 
times people build up a sense of trust and there is a return to cooperation. If players are allowed 
to punish free riders by fining them the game usually evolves to a cooperative outcome (for a 
summary of PG games see Gintis 2000b, Chapter 11).           
Results from the ultimatum game, the public goods game, and other game theoretic 
experiments show that, in a variety of settings and under a variety of assumptions, other-
regarding motives are a better predictor of behavior than those embodied in self-regarding Homo 
economicus. Humans regularly exhibit a culturally-conditioned sense of fairness and they are 
willing to enforce cultural norms even at economic cost to themselves. 
 
VII. Some Key Findings from Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics  
If the neoclassical assumptions about human behavior (transitivity, non-satiation, strictly 
rational behavior) are untenable, where do we go from here? Is it possible to construct a model of 
human behavior consistent across disciplines to inform economic theory and policy? The answer 
is a tentative ―yes.‖ A number of empirical findings and behavioral regularities have been 
identified and these are beginning to be used to inform public policy.  
 
1. Emotions are not ―irrational‖, they are essential to decision-making in humans. The standard 
view is that people strive to make rational decisions but are sometimes thwarted by their 
emotions. By contrast, the emerging view of cognition is that the human brain it is a unified, 
highly evolved system with complementary, rather than conflicting (rational and emotional), 25 
 
components.  Referring to the idea of some economists that ―irrational‖ behavior is the product 
of ancient emotional systems within the brain, Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer (2005, 252) write:  
What we cannot stress strongly enough is that the vast majority of evolutionary biologists 
and neurobiologists reject this view. There are probably two principle reasons that 
biologists reject this dualist view of the nervous system; one neurobiological and one 
behavioral. First there is no neurobiological evidence that emotional and non-emotional 
systems are fully distinct in the architecture of the human brain. Second there is no 
evidence that rational and irrational behaviors are the products of two distinct brain 
systems, one of which is uniquely rational and one of which is uniquely irrational. 
 
Studies have shown that some people with neurological damage to the emotional part of the 
brain are incapable of making even simple decisions even though they can clearly describe the 
problems they are asked to solve and the consequences of each possible decision. More 
surprisingly, people with damage to a part of the brain called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
act like ―rational economic men.‖ For example, most people would have difficulty making the 
following choice: ―You know that a carrier of a deadly airborne strain of Ebola is about to board 
a plane where he will share the same stale air with scores of strangers. Do you allow him to risk 
infecting fellow passengers or do you kill him if that is the only way to prevent him from getting 
on the flight?‖ (Swaminathan 2007) Yet people with brain damage have no problem in 
answering the question. They would make the rational, utilitarian decision and kill the passenger. 
 
…[W]hen people are confronted with ambiguity their emotions can overpower their 
reasoning, leading them to reject risky propositions. This raises the intriguing possibility that 
people who are less fearful than others might make better investors, which is precisely what 
George Loewenstein and four other researchers found when they carried out a series of 
experiments with a group of patients who had suffered brain damage. Each of the patients 
had a lesion in one of three regions of the brain that are central to the processing of 
emotions… The researchers presented the patients with a series of fifty-fifty gambles, in 
which they stood to win a dollar-fifty or lose a dollar. This is the type of gamble that people 
often reject, owing to loss aversion, but the patients with lesions accepted the bets more than 
eighty per cent of the time, and they ended up making significantly more money than a 
control group made up of people who had no brain damage (Cassidy 2006 ). 
 
2. There is no sharp distinction between ―brain‖, ―mind‖, and ―society.  One of the most 
remarkable findings from neuroscience is the importance of socialization in human brain 
development. According to Brian Wexler (2006) two important ideas have emerged from new 
knowledge about the sensitivity of the human brain to social inputs. The first is the incredible 26 
 
diversity and variability among individuals resulting from environmental influences on brain 
development. Wexler (2006, 3) writes: 
There is an evolutionary advantage for life forms that reproduce sexually because mixing 
of genetic material from parents produces variety in their offspring. Thus, different 
individuals have different characteristics, which increases the likelihood that some 
members of the group will be able to function and reproduce even when the environment 
in which the group lives changes. In an analogous manner, the distinctive postnatal shaping 
of each individual‘s brain function through interaction with other people, and through his 
or her own mix of sensory inputs, creates an endless variety of individuals with different 
functional characteristics. This broadens the range of adaptive and problem-solving 
capabilities well beyond the variability achieved by sexual reproduction.   
 
It has long been realized that human are unique in the length of time required to raise a child to 
maturity. Neoteny, the characteristic of retaining juvenile features, may function in humans to 
extend prenatal development after birth.
3 Again quoting Wexler (2006, 98): 
Infancy and childhood last much longer in humans than in other mammals, allowing 
greater influence of these social interactions on brain development. The process through 
which such interactions have their effects has been well studied, albeit more descriptively 
rather than experimentally. Several distinct but overlapping and interacting processes have 
been described: instrumental parenting , turn taking, imitation, identification, 
internalization, and play.  These processes are the basis for the long-lasting effects of the 
social environment on development of the human brain, the sensitivity of humans to 
change in their environment in general and their social environment in particular, and the 
great efforts humans will make to maintain consistency in their environment. 
 
The human brain continues to develop neurologically for years after birth and the way it 
develops depends critically on how a child is socialized. It is another way that variability can be 
introduced into evolutionary mix. This also provides a sort of microfoundation to Richerson and 
Boyd‘s (2005) argument that large brains were an evolutionary advantage for humans during the 
extreme climate volatility during ice ages. The ability to adapt customs and technology to 
changing conditions allowed humans to successfully compete for food resources with animals 
that depended on more purely genetic adaptation mechanisms.               
  Wexler‘s second insight into human brain development is even more important for 
climate change adaptation and climate change policy. Humans alter the environment that shapes 
brain development to an unprecedented degree. Wexler (2006, 3) writes:  
These human alterations in the shared social environment include physical structures, laws 
and other codes of behavior, food and clothes, spoken and written language, and music and 
other arts…It is this ability to shape the environment that in turn shapes our brains that has 27 
 
allowed human adaptability and capability to develop at a much faster rate than is possible 
through alteration of the genetic code itself.  
 
Most of the world‘s population (although certainly not all) live in a material environment almost 
entirely created by humans.  Very little of our well-being comes directly from the natural world 
(although ultimately, of course, it all does). We have adapted technologically, socially, and even 
neurologically to a human world insulated from the ultimate effects of our activities on the earth 
that supports us. For most of us climate change is something in the distant future affecting people 
in distant lands. But again, the good news is that humans have an unrivaled ability to adapt to 
new situations and meet new challenges. The importance of post-natal brain development in 
humans means that we have the innate ability to change our attitudes and ways of living both to 
reduce our pressure on the environment and to adapt to the inevitable changes we have set in 
motion. The evolution of our ―social brain‖ (Grist 2009) means that pure altruism can exist and 
override egoism for the good of the group.         
 
3. Most of our daily decisions are made unconsciously. Rational deliberation is a costly, time 
consuming process. The human brain has a variety of ways to conserve on thinking and this has 
important policy implications. One of the most relevant is the difference between ―opt-in‖ or 
―opt-out‖ choices. For example, consider the statistics for different countries on organ donations. 
 
Table 1. Percent of Drivers Donating Organs 
Denmark                     4% 
Netherlands               28% 
United Kingdom        17% 
Germany                    12% 
Austria                      100% 
Belgium                       98% 
France                       100% 
Hungary                    100% 
Poland                       100% 
Portugal                    100% 
Sweden                       86%    
 
Source: youtube presentation by Dan Ariely at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhjUJTw2i1M 
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What accounts for the vast differences in donation rates in countries that are otherwise quite 
similar? The answer is simply that people in the first four countries listed in table 1 are asked the 
question on their driver‘s application ―Check the box below if you want to participate in the 
organ donor program.‖  People in the other countries were asked the question ―Check the box 
below if you do not want to participate in the organ donor program.‖ We like to think of 
ourselves as rational decision makers in control of the choices we make. But in effect the person 
who designed the questions is really the one who made the choice about organ donations. Organ 
donation is a rather complicated moral decision and we would prefer not to think too much about 
it, so the fall-back, do-nothing-active choice is appealing.    
 
4. Habituation and heuristic short-cuts are important in human decision-making. The process of 
learning involves familiarizing ourselves with new information to the extent that we no longer 
have to consciously think about it when it comes up. We make most decisions based on past 
experience. Habituation also has a neurological basis.  It has long been known that two groups of 
neurons, in the ventral tegmental and the substantia nigra pars compacta areas, and the 
dopamine they release, are critical for reinforcing certain kinds of behavior (Schultz, Dayan and 
Montague 1997; Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer 2005). Schultz (2002) measured the activity of 
these neurons while thirsty monkeys sat quietly and listened for a tone which was followed by a 
squirt of fruit juice into their mouths. After a period of a fixed, steady amount of juice, the 
amount of juice was doubled without warning. The rate of neuron firing went from about 3 per 
second to 80 per second. As this new magnitude of reward was repeated, the firing rate returned 
to the baseline rate of 3 firings per second. The opposite happened when the reward was reduced 
without warning. The firing rate dropped dramatically, but then returned to the baseline rate of 3 
firings per second.  
  Humans become habituated both to higher levels of reward and lower levels. Again, for 
public policy considerations this has good and bad consequences. Consider the case of 
consumption. Consuming market goods can be a kind of addiction that requires ever increasing 
amounts to give us a constant level of satisfaction. On the other hand, another implication is that 




5. Altruism and Group Selection 
  One of the most important revolutions in biology in recent years has been the wide-
spread acceptance of group selection (Sober and Wilson 1998, Wilson and Wilson 2008). For a 
long time it was thought that any individual that acted for the good of the group would 
jeopardize its own survivability and thus such behavior would be quickly weeded out by natural 
selection. Wilson and Wilson (2008, 390) write: 
Prudently managing a shared resource benefits all members of a group, including any 
―cheaters‖ who consume more than their share. Genes associated with cheating would 
therefore spread throughout the group, and the propensity for cooperative resource 
management would be undermined. The situation is all too familiar in human experience; 
it is the phenomenon that Garret Hardin famously named ―the tragedy of the commons.‖ 
 
In the 1970s many economists became enamored with the ―selfish gene‖ idea in biology 
(Dawkins 1976). It seemed to offer a ―natural‖, ―scientific‖ justification for rational economic 
man and for free market economic policies (Manner and Gowdy 2009). At that time theories of 
group selection in biology were in disfavor because there seemed to be no way around the fact 
that altruistic behavior made an organism less fit compared to its non-altruistic competitors. But 
gradually biologists came to realize that pure altruism could emerge if such behavior gave a 
competitive advantage to a particular group. Price (1970, 1972) presented a mathematical 
formula that decomposed changes in gene populations into two effects; between group and 
within group selection. If competition existed between groups, then individual behavioral traits  
that conferred an advantage to the group could be selected. Once it was established that 
cooperative behavior (pure altruism) could have an evolutionary advantage, theories of group 
selection once again became acceptable to biologists (Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). 
Group selection refers to a process of natural selection that favors traits that increase the 
fitness of one group relative to other groups (Wilson 2005). Every member of the group depends 
on a common characteristic not isolated in a single individual. Such behavior is the result of 
Darwinian ―selection‖ but not selection rooted solely in the characteristics of individuals 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). Group selection depends on other-regarding interaction among 
individuals, and is thus incompatible with isolated, self-referential interaction between cultural 
and genetic transmission. In social animals, natural selection is more likely to favor pro-social 
behavior than the selfish gene model would predict. Henrich (2004) notes that a purely genetic 
approach cannot explain the degree of pro-social behavior observed in humans. He suggests that 30 
 
a co-evolutionary process between cultural and genetic transmission is at work. Using a group 
selection perspective we can pose a scientific explanation for the cooperation and fairness 
observed in large groups and among unrelated strangers in non-repeated contexts. Given the 
genetic homogeneity of the human species, the wide variation in degrees of cooperation observed 
in human societies points to a cultural origin. In addition, if the large scale cooperation often 
observed in humans was purely based on genetic natural selection one would anticipate it would 
be more widespread in nature. Henrich (2004, 30) suggests:  
…rooting the development of large-scale cooperation in the details of human social 
learning, addresses this challenge.  Other mammals do not cooperate to the degree humans 
do because they lack the social learning abilities that produce cultural evolution and 
behavioral equilibria not available to genetic transmission alone.  
 
Bands of early humans competed against each other for scarce resources and those bands 
that were more cohesive most likely had a survival advantage. Wilson (2005) regards the 
distinction between absolute and relative fitness as essential to understanding the impact of 
group selection. By increasing the absolute fitness of individuals within a single, isolated group 
(or population) to the same degree, their relative fitness does not alter, so that the fitness change 
will be without evolutionary consequences. But when adding other groups that interact (perhaps 
depending on the same scarce resources), the absolute change in fitness for the original 
individuals will mean an improved average fitness of the group relative to that of other groups. 
Then the group may grow more quickly than other groups and thus will increase its proportion in 
the total population. Wilson notes that explanations based on individual-level selection tend to 
neglect the possibility of group selection effects because they focus on absolute instead of 
relative fitness improvements. He notes that by changing strategy individuals may reduce their 
relative fitness even if they improve their absolute fitness, simply because the group as a whole 
benefits from their change of strategy, as in the case of altruistic acts (van den Bergh and Gowdy 
2009).  
 
6. A sense of fairness is a universal human attribute although notions of fairness differ across 
cultures. Results from game theory and behavioral economics show that preferences are other-
regarding. People act to affect the well-being of others, positively or negatively, even at 
significant cost to themselves (Fehr and Gächter, 1999). A sense of fairness, including pure 
altruism, is a critical factor in economic decisions. This is illustrated in various game theory 31 
 
experiments such as the public good game in which participants are willing to impose, at great 
cost to themselves, punishments on non-contributors, even in the last round of the game (Bowles 
and Gintis 2002). These kinds of behavior patterns have important consequences for judgments 
about human well-being and environmental policy design. 
According to the biologist Alexander (1987), the evolution of ethics received a major 
stimulus from the long history of violent interactions among ancestral primate groups, and in line 
with this was aimed at strengthening the structure of the own group. This is supported by 
asymmetric behavior in conflicts among (living) apes and monkeys: conflict resolving inside the 
group, and extreme brutality to outsiders. Similarly, humans apply ethics asymmetrically to 
insiders and outsiders of the group they belong to. The most convincing examples of this are 
wars and religious and ethnic conflicts (de Waal 1996, 29; Wilson 2002). In a recent study, Choi 
and Bowles (2007) invoke a group selection model to show that group conflict between humans 
may be closely related to the evolution of altruism and a sense of what is fair and unfair. The 
latter has two faces, namely providing benefits to fellow group members and showing hostility 
towards outsiders, both at a personal cost. Field (2004, 8) phrases it as: ―… the ability to make 
common cause has a dark side: the control of within group conflict sometimes lays the 
foundation for violent attacks on outgroups. But the inclination is also what brings millions of 
people to the polls in democratic nations and is as much an underpinning of democracy as it is of 
totalitarianism.‖  
 
7. Time Inconsistency and Hyperbolic Discounting  
Time consistency is critical to the standard economic assumption that benefits delivered 
in the future should be discounted at a fixed rate. But behavioral studies indicate that people 
discount the near future at a higher rate than the distant future and they have different discount 
rates for different kinds of outcomes (Frederick, Loewenstein and O‘Donohue 2004). This is 
called hyperbolic discounting and, as shown in   
Figure 5, the discount rate declines then flattens out so that after some time the present value of 
income received in the future does not continue to decrease.   
The existence of hyperbolic discounting implies that standard economic analysis may 
seriously underestimate the long-term benefits of climate change mitigation policies. If people 
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be used to place values on distant-future environmental damages such as those caused by abrupt 
climate change. Hyperbolic discounting has been widely discussed in the theoretical literature 
and has had some impact on policy recommendations. Cropper and Laibson (1999) recommend 
using hyperbolic discounting in the case of global warming and Chichilnisky (1996) uses 
hyperbolic discounting in her model of sustainable development.  One of the positive features of 
welfare economics is that, in theory, it respects individual choice. If individuals choose to place 
the same value on biodiversity present 50 years from now as they do on biodiversity 100 years 





Figure 5. Hyperbolic discounting
 
Rubinstein (2003) points out that hyperbolic discounting has been accepted by many 
economists because it can be easily incorporated into the net present value framework of 
standard economic analysis. He argues that the evidence suggests that the larger problem is 
inconsistent, not hyperbolic, discounting. People appear to have different discount rates for 
different kinds of outcomes. Considerable evidence exists that people are wildly inconsistent 
even when discounting similar things. Inconsistent discounting suggests that there may be limits 
to attempts to placing precise numbers on the general tendency of individuals to prefer 
something now rather than later.     33 
 
Anticipation has been found to be a positive thing in itself and may result in something in 
the future actually having a higher value (Loewenstein 1987). This finding is relevant to 
environmental policies such as preserving national parks and other wildlife areas because 
individuals may enjoy them more in the future (after retirement, for example) and the 
anticipation of this is important.  
8. The status quo bias, the endowment effect and prospect theory – One of the first behavioral 
challenges to Homo economicus came from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their formulation 
of ―prospect theory‖, that is, people evaluate changes in terms of a reference point. Anchoring is 
similar to prospect theory but a little more subtle. Researchers have discovered that estimates of 
probabilities (or payoffs) are related to immediate cues that ―irrationally‖ influence valuation.  
It seems to be a psychological law that people prefer something they already have to something 
they do not have (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In a classic experiment by Jack Knetsch (1989) 
students in three classes were given the choice between a coffee cup and a chocolate bar. 
Students who were initially given a mug or a chocolate bar overwhelmingly chose to keep 
whichever one they were given. Those who were offered a choice at the end of the experiment 
had no clear preference. Tests of the endowment effect have shown that it is not due to wealth 
effects, income disparities, strategic behavior or transactions costs (Knetch 1989).  
 
9. Loss Aversion   
One of the first behavior-based challenges to neoclassical economics came from Maurice 
Allais in the early 1950s in the form of the Allais paradox  (Allais 1952). Using an example 
based on loss aversion Allais demonstrated the inconsistency of actual consumer choices and the 
predictions of expected utility theory.  The explicit assumption in economic analysis is that only 
the absolute magnitude of the change matters, not the direction of the change. But the behavioral 
pattern is that people are more concerned about avoiding losses than they are about acquiring 
gains is well documented (Knetsch and Sinden 1984). The hypothesis that losses are 
systematically valued more than equivalent gains has been verified in numerous experiments. 
These experiments show that preferences depend on the direction of the change, that is, whether 
people are paid to give up something they have, or have to pay to get something they do not 
have. The psychological model makes good predictions of economic behavior; the rational actor 
model does not.     34 
 
The neurological basis for loss aversion was confirmed by Tom et al. (2007). They found 
that in order for people to accept a 50-50 gamble the potential gain needs to be twice as high as 
the potential loss. They discovered that the brain regions that evaluated potential gains and losses 
were more sensitive to losses. Also, between-subject differences in loss aversion reflected 
between-subject differences in neural responses.  
Loss aversion is one reason for the widely reported discrepancy between willingness to pay 
for a gain (WTP) and willingness to accept a loss (WTA) measures of environmental changes 
(Brown and Gregory 1999). Estimates of WTA a loss of something are typically several times 
greater than WTP for the gain of the same item. The implications for evaluating the costs of 
climate change are profound. Even in the context of standard utility theory, the required 
compensation for climate change damages (WTA) is likely to be much greater than the estimated 
market value of that loss (WTP).     
There is most likely an evolutionary basis for loss aversion. Early humans were more 
likely to survive if they avoided potentially dangerous situations even if the expected payoffs 
were high. Humans are content to ―satisfice‖ rather than ―optimize‖ (Simon 1987). 
 
10. ―Them and Us‖ - Herd Behavior and Group Selection  
The human ability to cooperate with unrelated others is unique among mammals. But the 
groupishness of humans also has a dark side. Humans are also unique in their ability to inflict the 
most unimaginable atrocities on members of their species they classify as ―others.‖ A strong case 
can be made that this has an evolutionary basis.   For most of our existence humans lived in 
small bands of hunter-gatherers in competition with other, similar bands. Boehm (1997) argues 
that those bands that had a stronger social cohesion were able to out-compete other less cohesive 
bands. This group selection process became even stronger with the advent of large-scale societies 
after the wide-spread adoption of agriculture some 8,000 years ago. Boehm argues further that 
human institutions had a great impact on human evolution. David Sloan Wilson (2002) argues 
that organized religions may be the result of evolutionary selection because of its almost unique 
ability to strongly bond together unrelated individuals.    
David Berreby (2005, chapter 8) describes a remarkable experiment illustrating both the 
negative consequences of ―them and us‖ behavior and also the ability of humans to redefine 
these categories. In 1954 Muzafer Sherif
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conducted an experiment in group behavior at Robbers Cave camp in the mountains of eastern 
Oklahoma (Sherif et al. 1961). Twenty-two middle class Caucasian boys enrolled in Oklahoma 
schools were divided into two groups of eleven boys each. Each group was assigned to a 
particular area with its own bunkhouse, mess hall, and swimming hole. Each group was given the 
freedom to explore the area and organize itself as the group members chose. The groups chose 
names (―Rattlers‖ and ―Eagles‖), designed their own logos, and constructed various behavioral 
rules that established their own identities. During the first week each group was unaware of the 
existence of the other group. 
After the first week each group was made aware of the other group. The reaction of each 
group toward the other was immediate and negative. Berreby writes: 
Among both bands, talk of ―our‖ swimming spot and ―our‖ field sprung up only 
after the boys knew there was another gang nearby. The feeling extended to everyone; 
fishermen and hikers passing through the state park would also cause the boys to fret about 
interference with ―our‖ territory. Their passionate sense of Eagleness and Rattlerdom was 
marking the entire human world (Berreby 2005, 170). 
 
A week of arranged competition between the groups (baseball games, tug-of-war 
contexts) made the rivalry between the two groups more intense and the sense of us versus them 
even more pronounced.  
 
 Fourteen days after they had arrived as strangers, then, these look-alike boys, all 
born around the same time, from look-alike households, had turned into two exclusive 
disdainful tribes, yelling ―dirty bums‖ and ―sissies‖ at their neighbors whenever their paths 
crossed. It had all been ―experimentally produced from scratch‖ as Sherif put it (Berreby 
2005, 173).         
 
At this point the results of the Robbers Cave experiment are discouraging. It seems that it 
is ―human nature‖ to automatically coalesce into hostile camps each with its own rules of 
conduct and defining characteristics of what is correct and incorrect behavior. ―Bad‖ human 
nature dominates our best intensions. But the third week of the experiment shows that the story 
of ―us and them‖ is not so bleak as popularly imagined.  
During the third week Sherif initiated what he deemed to be the main objective of the 
experiment, namely, to disprove the ―original sin‖ view of human nature. Sherif initiated a 
number of activities that required the two groups to work together—repairing a broken faucet, 
raising money to rent a movie, getting a disabled truck going again.  After a week of working 36 
 
together to solve common problems, the transformation of the ―us-them‖ mentality was 
remarkable: 
 
The last night, the boys decided they wanted to go to the camp‘s corral, where they 
roasted marshmallows. Then each group performed skits for the other. The next day was 
the last of the camp. At breakfast and lunch, the boys sat higgledy-piggledy, with no regard 
for Rattlerdom and Eagleness. The frequent opinion polls he was taking also told Sherif 
that attitudes were changing: overwhelmingly hostile sentiments about ―the others‖ had 
been replaced by overwhelmingly positive feelings. Meanwhile, the bands‘ ratings of their 
members had gotten somewhat less enthusiastic. It was as if the need to puff up their 
members had quieted, along with the urge to disparage the enemy. When they took seats 
on the bus for the trip home that afternoon, the boys ignored Rattler-Eagle lines completely 
(Berreby 2005, 176-177). 
 
Human history is full of accounts of horrible atrocities perpetuated by one group upon 
another. These groups may be based on real physical or ideological differences or they may be 
almost entirely arbitrary as in the Robbers Cave experiment. The good news is that the ―us-them‖ 
distinction is always arbitrary and can be changed through communication, increasing familiarity 
with out-group members, and the presence of some common challenge affecting all groups.   
 
11. Social Norms and Process Regarding Preferences  
People care about process as well as outcome. In designing economic policies the process 
of arriving at a decision may be as important for public acceptance as the actual outcome itself. 
For example, results from the ultimatum game (mean offers and rejection rates) vary 
significantly according to the process through which money is obtained and the way offers are 
made. Offers are substantially lower if proposers win their position by doing well on a quiz 
(Hoffman et al., 1994). Rejection rates are much lower if respondents are told that the offers 
were generated by a computer. In the prisoner‘s dilemma game, defection rates are significantly 
higher if the game is referred to as the ―Wall Street Game‖ rather than the ―Community Game.‖ 
Results from these and numerous other studies in game theory, experimental economics, and 
behavioral economics show that models that do not take into account social processes such as 
community norms about fairness may lead to poor predictors of economic behavior.  
Biased cultural transmission is a theory of innovation diffusion based on the observation 
that people imitate others whose actions they trust or respect. People use heuristics, mental 
shortcuts and rules of thumb, to make otherwise complicated decisions. Biased cultural 37 
 
transmission may lead to the widespread adoption of economically inefficient ways of doing 
things. By selectively imitating respected individuals, people may insure that innovations become 
established in a community whether or not the innovation is superior to others as determined by 
cost-benefit calculations (Henrich 2003). The important factor in adoption is the innovation‘s 
conformance with established cultural patterns. This has far-reaching implications for the design 
of economic policies. 
12. The Framing Effect  
Consistency in choice is the hallmark of rational economic man and it implies that the 
evaluation of choices will be unaffected by the manner in which the choices are framed. The 
―framing effect‖ means that the frame of reference may change according to how a particular 
choice is presented and this will affect the payoff decision. This effect has been confirmed in 
numerous other experiments and it too seems to have a neurological basis (Miller 2006). De 
Martino et al. (2006) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
1 to look at the 
neurological effects of framing in a simple experiment. A group of 20 subjects in the United 
Kingdom were asked to choose between identical outcomes framed differently. They were told 
first that they would initially receive ₤50. They then had to choose between a ―sure‖ option and a 
―gamble‖ option. The sure option was presented in two ways, either as a gain (say keep ₤20 of 
the ₤50) or as a loss (say lose ₤30 of the ₤50). The gamble option was presented in the same way 
in both cases—a pie chart showing the probability of winning or losing. People responded 
differently depending on how the question was framed and this was reflected in fMRI images. 
Different parts of the brain lit up depending on how the question was framed. 
The fact that the framing effect found in this experiment had a neurological basis was 
confirmed:  
Our data provide a neurobiological account of the framing effect, both within and across 
individuals. Increased activation in the amygdale was associated with subjects‘ tendency to 
 be risk-averse in the Gain frame and risk-seeking in the Loss frame, supporting the 
hypothesis that the framing effect is driven by an affect heuristic underwritten by an 
emotional system. (De Martino et al. 2006, 686)  
 




Neurological findings may or may not add anything new to the catalog of behavioral 
patterns observed by behavioral economics, but they do show that they are more than 
―anomalies‖. These observed behaviors are not random mistakes but rather are a part of our 
neurological inheritance.     
 
Two Other Interesting Behavioral Studies 
Several other behavioral regularities have been identified but they are not so well-
established. Nevertheless they are particularly interesting and relevant to climate change policy. 
 
The Licensing Effect 
An interesting study reported in Nature (xxx,) found that ―green shopping‖ actually 
increased selfish behavior. Students at the University of Toronto were first asked to buy a 
collection of products deemed to be either environmentally friendly or conventional. 
Some students picked the “green” products while others picked the regular products. 
The students then played a game in which they were given the opportunity to allocate 
money between themselves and someone else. Surprisingly, students who had bought 
green products were less willing to share than those who had bought conventional 
products. This is called the "licensing effect". Socially responsible behavior can establish 
the moral credentials that allow a person to engage in less responsible behavior later.    
 
Social Crowding out by Monetary Incentives 
A growing body of experimental evidence indicates that monetary incentives can be a 
deterrent to cooperative behavior (Frey 1997, Frey and Oberholtzer-Gee 2002). An often cited 
example is the finding that paying blood donors significantly reduces blood donations (Titmus 
1971). A recent experiment found that the mere mention of ―money‖ had a negative effect on 
sociality. Vohs, Mead and Goode (2006) performed several experiments which compared 
various kinds of social behavior in groups of people that were first given reminders of ―money‖ 
with groups given a ―non-money‖ reminder. For example, in one experiment participants were 
asked to unscramble jumbled words to make phrases. In the money group the phrases involved 
some concept of money, like ―a high-paying salary is important.‖ In the control group the 
phrases were neutral, like ―it is cold outside‖. This reinforced thinking in terms of money in the 39 
 
experimental group but not the control group. The groups were then subjected to nine 
experiments designed to test the effects of exposure to money on ―self-sufficiency‖ and helpful 
behavior. In one experiment subjects were given $2 in quarters which they were told was left 
over from an earlier experiment. At the end of the word scrambling game they were offered the 
chance to put money in a box to denote to needy students. Those exposed to reminders of money 
gave substantially less to the charity. In another experiment subjects reminded of money were 
less likely to ask for help in performing a complicated task. In another test, subjects were asked 
to sit at desks and fill out a questionnaire. Some desks faced a poster with a picture of money, 
and others faced a poster showing flowers or a seascape. They were then asked to choose 
between a reward characterized as a ―group‖ or ―individual‖ activity, for example, individual 
cooking lessons versus a dinner for four. Those exposed to the money poster were more likely to 
pick individual activities.  The authors summarize the results as follows:  
Relative to participants primed with neutral concepts, participants primed with money 
preferred to stay alone, work alone, and put more physical distance between themselves 
and a new acquaintance…. When reminded of money, people would want to be free from 
dependency and would also prefer that others not depend on them‖ (Vohs, Mead, and 
Goode, 2006, 1154).         
 
     Behavioral responses like these, point to the importance of carefully considering the 
unintended consequences of climate change policies. The overriding lesson of behavioral and 
neuroeconomics is that the human brain is a complex system geared to surviving in a social 
world. To be ―rational‖ is to make correct choices in particular social contexts with fluid and 
ever-changing rules of behavior.     
   
VIII. Happiness and Income 
As discussed above, most economic models, including climate change models, assume 
that social well-being can be equated to per capita income. Psychologists have long argued that 
well-being derives from a wide variety of individual, social and genetic factors. Economists 
came to the issue later but significant contributions have been made by Easterlin (1974), Frank 
(1999), Frey (1997), and Layard (2005). Recently (September 2009) a report commissioned by 
the government of France and headed by Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen called 
for the abandonment of  ―GDP fetishism‖ and the use of an array of social and environmental 40 
 
indicators as a guide to public policy. As Stiglitz pointed out, the Report of the Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, was made even more timely by 
the financial meltdown which laid bare the ephemeral nature of financial accounting. According 
to Stiglitz ―A focus on the material aspects of GDP may be especially inappropriate as the world 
faces the crisis of global warming. Should we ‗punish‘ a country—in terms of our measure of 
performance—if it decides to take some of the fruits of the increase in productivity from the 
advancement of knowledge in the form of leisure, rather than just consuming more goods? ‖ 
(quoted in Kolbert 2009).      
The increasingly high level of rigor of experimental psychology has helped to make the 
idea of direct measures of utility acceptable to economists. Methods have been devised and 
tested and calibrated to accurately measure levels of happiness across individuals and even 
across cultures. We are now closer than anyone could have imagined to developing something 
like Bentham‘s ―hedonometer‖ providing a cardinal measure of social well-being.  
  What makes people happy? Surveys, behavioral experiments, and neurological analysis 
have identified key factors positively influencing well-being. These include health (especially 
self-reported health) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag 2002), close relationships and marriage, 
intelligence, education, and religion (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Age, gender and income also 
influence happiness, but not to the degree once thought. Some ―stylized facts‖ about income and 
happiness have been established. First, people in wealthier countries are generally happier than 
people in poorer countries (Diener, Diener, and Diener 1995). But even this correlation is weak 
and the happiness data shows many anomalies. For example, some surveys show that people in 
Nigeria are happier than people in Austria, France and Japan (Frey and Stutzer 2002, table 2.2, p. 
35). Second, past a certain stage of development, increasing incomes do not lead to greater 
happiness. For example, real per capita income in the U.S. has increased sharply in recent 
decades but reported happiness has declined (Blanchflower and Oswald 2000, Lane 2000, 
Meyers 2000). Similar results have been reported for Japan and Western Europe (Easterlin 
1995). Studies of individuals also show a lack of correlation between increases in income and 
increases in happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Third, security seems to be a key element in 
happiness. Large welfare gains would come from a focus on improving welfare based on those 
things that increase individual security like health insurance, old age security, employment and 
job security. Fourth, mental health is a crucial factor in happiness. Frey and Stutzer (2002) and 41 
 
Layard (2005) argue, based on happiness survey results, for more public spending on mental 
health, especially for the very young since apparently the first few years of a person‘s life play a 
large role in their future happiness. If we want future generations to experience a high and 
sustainable level of welfare, we are likely to get high rates of return by investing in policies to 
insure adequate child nutrition, health care, education, and family counseling. Fifth, richer social 
relationships generally make people happier. This implies that welfare gains may be obtained 
from increased leisure time, and more public spending on social and recreational infrastructure.  
All of this research implies that the focus on GNP growth as a means to increase welfare may be 
misplaced. Ng (2003, 307) has demonstrated that analyzing preferences while ignoring the larger 
objective of welfare or happiness introduces a systematic materialistic bias: 
Such a bias, in combination with relative-income effects, environmental disruption effects, 
and over-estimation of the excess burden of taxation, results in over-spending on private 
consumption and under-provision of public goods, and may make economic growth 
welfare-reducing. 
 
What are the implications of all this for climate change policy? There is some evidence 
that when individuals are more secure financially (not necessary wealthier) they are more likely 
to care about the well-being of future generations and the well-being of the environment. Rangel 
(2003) argues that social security is good for the environment. Several of the economic security 
increasing policies discussed above—providing  health care, job security, and a minimum 
income—may be classified as ―backward generational goods.‖ These goods play a crucial role in 
sustaining investment in ―forward intergenerational goods‖ such as environmental preservation. 
So it seems that focusing policies on subjective indicators of happiness, rather than on per capita 
income, would pay a double dividend. People would be happier and also more willing to support 
polices promoting environmental sustainability. Welsch (2002) uses reported well-being for 54 
countries to estimate a hedonic indicator of the trade-off between environmental quality and per 
capita income. Welsch‘s study is path-breaking in that it takes self-reported happiness as an 
indicator of welfare, and treats per capita income as an explanatory variable. Welsch finds 
support for the hypothesis that specific forms of pollution are negatively related to well-being. 
Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala (2002) found that, not only are people averse to 
inequality, risk, and a decline in relative standing, the social marginal utility of income may turn 
negative even at non-extreme income levels. Regarding the environment there is considerable 42 
 
evidence that at least some people hold non-anthropocentric ethical views (Johansson-Stenman 
2002). 
  Focusing policy on well-being rather than per capita consumption might have important 
positive implications for sustainability. But even if sustainable welfare policies are based on 
scientifically measured ―preferences‖ this leaves us with the problem that it may not insure the 
preservation of the life support systems of the planet. Examples abound of societies that 
apparently worked well in satisfying the preferences of their citizens but ended in ecological 
collapse (Brander and Taylor 1998). Humans get subjective well-being from nature but this does 
not insure that individuals living today will choose to preserve those features of nature that may 
be essential to future generations. Viewing the essential life support systems of the planet as 
mere inputs into a utility function, no matter how broadly defined, denies the basic biophysical 
nature of the human species. To fully develop a viable alternative to the neoclassical notion of 
sustainability, scientific measures of the factors contributing to human well-being are needed as 
well as indicators of the physical and biological requirements for long-term human survival. 
 
IX. Economists Reaction to Behavioral Economics 
The reaction of most economists to behavioral economics and neuroscience has been 
positive. Leading economics journals regularly publish papers by behavioral economists, and 
leading economics departments offer courses on the subject. It must be said, however, that the 
rational actor model still holds sway in the economics profession. The rationality assumption lies 
at the core of neoclassical welfare economics and supports the major theoretical tools—
equilibrium, marginal analysis, revealed preference—of economic analysis. Rank and file 
economists are, for the most part, unconcerned about the implications of the behavioral findings 
but the top neoclassical theorists recognize the threat to the core principles of Walrasian theory: 
Perhaps nothing is more readily distinctive about economics than the insistence on a 
unifying behavioral basis for explanations, in particular, a postulate of maximizing 
behavior. The need for such a theoretical basis is not controversial; to reject it is to reject 
economics (Silverberg 1990, 14). 
 
There have been two major reactions by neoclassical economists to the behavioral and 
neuroscience challenge. They may be summarized as follows: 
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1.  People may initially make ―irrational‖ decisions but choosing under uncertainty is a learning 
process and people eventually correct their mistakes. An early version of this defense was given 
by Marshack and Savage (1954). A recent extension of this idea is that markets train people to be 
rational.  John List argues that the behavior of experienced agents generally conform well to 
neoclassical theory.  For example, professional baseball card traders do not exhibit an 
endowment effect, compared to amateur card traders (Levitt and List 2008, Haigh and List 
2005).   Their argument is that market participation helps people to learn to behave rationally and 
this is another justification for the expansion of markets. An empirical test among the Papua New 
Guinea found no evidence to support the ―market integration‖ hypothesis (Tracer 2004). 
List also found evidence that experience as a card trader spilled over when people were 
asked to trade other goods. Only inexperienced traders tended to be influenced by the 
endowment effect. A criticism of this defense is that, people are not trained in markets to make 
the most important decisions in their lives. Experimental economics in general has been 
criticized for examining behavior in unrealistic settings (the laboratory) and for training 
participants to make choices consistent with economic theory.   
   
 2. ―Irrational‖ behavior might be interesting but it‘s not economics. This argument was made 
forcefully by Gul and  Pensdorfer (2008) in a paper appropriately titled ―The Case for Mindless 
Economics.‖  They assert:  ―Neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the 
latter make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of the brain.‖ In fact 
the validity of revealed preferences (market or pseudo market choices) as ―optimal‖ or 
―efficient‖ depends, in the standard model, on the assumption of rational behavior. The 
assumptions of the standard model (transitivity, non-satiation, the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, self-regarding preferences) are assertions about human psychology and ultimately 
about brain physiology.  This is really an old debate going back to Paul Samuelson‘s theory of 
revealed preference. At first it was thought that that theory provided a ―positive‖ foundation for 
economic theory, but it was soon realized that to construct indifference curves based on revealed 
choices required all the assumptions of Homo economicus.    
 
XI. The Importance of Evolution  44 
 
Behavioral economics is still in the process of establishing itself as a coherent alternative 
to the dominant Walrasian paradigm. There are several reasons for this, the main one being the 
infancy of behavioral economics. But another is the failure of behavioral economics to coalesce 
within a larger theoretical framework. Evolutionary theory may offer such a framework. Like 
behavioralism in general, behavioral economics ignores evolutionary history and still tends to 
see behavior as a collection of blank slate "anomalies." An evolutionary framework could help 
organize the uncovered behavioral regularities into a systematic explanation of behavior. For 
example, "fairness" seems to be a universal human attribute although it is manifested in different 
ways in different cultures. Humans have an incredible amount of behavioral and cultural 
flexibility but we do have an evolutionary history and genetic constraints. A good metaphor 
might be that the human mind is more like a coloring book than a blank slate.  
 
Secondly, behavioral economics is still one dimensional. Behavioral economics recognizes that 
people may care about others but it still focuses on the decisions of individuals with no notion of 
groups or hierarchies. David Sloan Wilson's research shows that pro-social behavior is embedded 
in pro-social groups. This is a critical insight. There is a real need to explore the middle ground 
between bottom up policies directed at modifying individual behavior on the one hand and top-
down government regulations on the other (Ostrom 1990).  
 
Another idea from evolutionary theory is the notion of "mismatch theory." An organism may 
have traits that are well adapted to one environment but become maladaptive when the 
environment changes. For example, a craving for sugar and fat was adaptive when we lived as 
hunter-gatherer with scarce resources and lots of exercise but is maladaptive in today's food 
abundant (for most of us) and sedentary world. This also relates to hierarchy. Conspicuous 
consumption may be adaptive at the individual level to convey status but has become disastrous 
at the species level as overconsumption is undermining the planet's life support systems. 
 
XII. Summary: Climate Change, Neuroscience and Behavioral Economics 
What do we go from here?  How can behavioral insights be applied to policy? What do we need 
to know to successfully inform climate change policy? 
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1. Humans are naturally risk averse 
2. Long-term planning is psychologically difficult 
3. Climate change is a clear and present danger that will require significant life-style changes. 
Nudging is not enough. Happiness studies show that less consumption, more leisure time can 
make us better off. 
4. Extreme malleability of individuals. But cultures are hard to change because humans are 
hardwired at an early age.  
5. ―Us‖ and ―them‖ are natural categories but they can be re-defined. 
6. Any policy carries the risk of unintended consequences. 
 
XIII. Some Possible Garrison Institute Initiatives 
  Develop a common research agenda that explores the following: 
o  Linking neuro-economics and behavioral economics – the evolutionary basis for 
human behavior to climate change policy 
o  Changing behavior as well as changing attitudes  
o  The policy relationship between well-being, GDP, and neuro and behavioral 
economics 
o  The role of behavior and institutions in adaptation to climate change by the 
world’s poorest 
o  The role of behavior in reducing green house gas emissions from the occupants 
of buildings. 
o  How to enlarge the ‘behavioral wedge’, which amounts to 1 gigaton of reduction 
in CO2 
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1. Parts of this survey are adapted from the following articles: the  J. Gowdy and R. Juliá. 2010. 
―Global Warming Economics in the Long Run‖ Land Economics 86(1), 117-130;  J. van den 
Bergh and J. Gowdy. 2009. ―A Group Selection Perspective on Economic Behavior, Institutions 
and Organizations‖ Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 72, 1-20; and J. Gowdy. 
2008. ―Behavioral Economics and Climate Change Policy‖ Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 68: 632-644.   
 
2. Sherif himself was almost a victim of the ―Us-Them‖ syndrome. In 1919, as a young boy he 
narrowly escaped being killed in the Greek massacre of Turks in the city of Smyrna in 
southeastern Turkey.  
 
3. An interesting case of neoteny that might be relevant to human behavior is the difference 
between bonobos and chimpanzees. Compared to chimpanzees, adult bonobos are more playful 
and share food readily. They are also less socially inhibited as adults. A recent study (Wobber et 
al. 2010) suggests that this behavior is due to the retention of juvenile characteristics.    